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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
the clearest.31 To remedy evils, the State legislature may move one step at a
time.3 8 It may operate in one field and supply a remedy while it neglects
others.
JOSEPH V. RODDY
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CORPORATIONS-WHETHER THE COURT OF THE FORUM
MAY DISREGARD SUCCESSORSHIP TO A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A MULTISTATE
LIBEL VALIDLY ASSIGNED ELSEWHERE BY AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION
TO A NEWLY FORMED CORPORATION INTO WHICH IT HAS MERGED AND RE-
FUSE TO PERMIT SUIT BY THE CORPORATE SUCCESSQR BASED ON THE FORUM'S
DOMESTIC SUBSTANTIVE LAW-In Association for the Preservation of Free-
dom of Choice, Inc. v. New York Post Corporation,1 a New York court
had before it a novel and important question in the area of conflict of
laws involving increasingly significant problems in the multi-state libel
situation.
The defendant published a libel about an unincorporated group called
Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, which had members
in a number of states and the District of Columbia, on May 14, 1959.
The defendant's newspaper with the libelous article was circulated into
various states, including New York, and the District of Columbia. In
August, 1959, the unincorporated organization, pursuant to a prior unan-
imous agreement that it should incorporate in the District of Columbia,
and that upon incorporation the new corporation should succeed to all of
the group's members, property, and claims, incorporated the group under
the same name in the District of Columbia by having three residents of
District who were members of the unincorporated association secure a char-
ter with the same name and purposes as the unincorporated group pur-
suant to District of Columbia law from the Superintendent of Corporations
there. Thereupon, the membership of the unincorporated group merged
into the corporation, and the unincorporated group ceased to exist as a
separate organization.
In May, 1960, the corporation brought suit as plaintiff in its own
name as successor to the unincorporated group for libel against the de-
fendant newspaper. The court dismissed the claim. It held that although
a valid successorship might have been created in the District of Columbia,
the question presented was "the ownership of the claim or who may sue
under the law of the forum which governs the question of the capacity to
sue." Since it held that a libel claim was not assignable in New York, the
court concluded that "the resident of another State cannot avail itself of
37 Godlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 414 Ill. 89, 98, 110 N.E. 2d 234 (1953).
38 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
1 35 Misc. 2d 65, 228 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1962).
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such a claim by assignment where a resident may not do so." Accordingly,
it dismissed the claim for want in the corporation of capacity to sue on it.
The court's decision raises seven issues, which are:
(1) Does the case involve the procedural question of capacity to sue
or the substantive question of the validity of the successorship and owner-
ship of the claim?
(2) If the question is substantive, what law governs?
(3) Is the succession valid under District of Columbia Law?
(4) Would an assignment be valid under District of Columbia law?
(5) Would a foreign succession violate a strong New York policy?
(6) Would a foreign assignment violate a strong New York policy?
(7) Even if a foreign assignment violated a strong local policy, would
the application of a local substantive statute to prevent suit on the valid
foreign assignment make the statute, as so applied, violative of the United
States Constitution?
These issues will be taken up under separate headings below.
(1) Is the question procedural or substantive?
In order to determine whether the question is the procedural one of
capacity to sue, or the substantive one of ownership of the cause of action,
reference to the law of the forum is required to determine the meaning
of the term "capacity to sue." The New York Court of Appeals has defined
the question of capacity to sue as one of personal status, and stated that
all persons, natural or artificial, have capacity to sue all others except
when under certain well-defined disabilities. In a leading case, the court
declared:
There is a difference between capacity to sue, which is the right
to come into court, and a cause of action, which is the right to
relief in court. Incapacity to sue exists when there is some legal
disability, such as infancy or lunacy or want of title in the plaintiff
to the character in which he sues. The plaintiff was duly appointed
receiver, and has a legal capacity to sue as such, and hence, could
bring the defendants into court by the service of a summons upon
them even if he had no cause of action against them. On the
other hand, an infant has no capacity to sue, and hence, could
not lawfully cause the defendants to be brought into court, even
if he had a good cause of action against them. Incapacity to sue
is not the same as insufficiency of facts to sue upon .... We think
that the plaintiff had capacity to sue, but that his complaint stated
no cause of action of which the county court had jurisdiction.2
Aside from those special instances in which a person attempts to sue
in a representative capacity, such as administrator, executor, receiver,
2 Ward v. Petrie, 157 N.Y. 301, 311-2, 51 N.E. 1002, 1005 (1898).
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trustee, and the like, and which entail a question as to whether the forum
will recognize such a representative's appointment under foreign law and
permit the representative, as such, to sue for the benefit of another, a per-
son or corporation suing for its own account either has capacity to sue
or has no such capacity. It cannot have capacity for some cases and no
capacity for others. This follows from the proposition that all persons
have full capacity unless under a well-defined disability,3 and may sue
regardless of whether they have a cause of action.4 If disabled, they lack
capacity in any case; if not, they always have such capacity.
A corporation is treated just like an individual. Ordinarily, it has
capacity to sue regardless of whether it has any causes of action. How-
ever, for reasons similar to those of individuals, it may be incapacitated.
For example, a war between the country chartering the corporation and
the forum will incapacitate corporations from suing on valid causes of
action just as alien nationals are incapacitated.5 Likewise, when a corpora-
tion is dissolved it loses its capacity to sue, 6 just as an individual who
dies loses his capacity. Even as to internal capacity, the law of the place
of incorporation governs.7
Whether the assignment of a cause of action is effective so as to give
the assignee the legal ownership of the claim and divest it from the as-
signor is not a problem of capacity to sue. As one case held:
It appears to be assumed by both of the parties that legal inca-
pacity of the plaintiff to sue may be shown by proof that she had
made an assignment of her rights by virtue of the stockholders'
3 Field v. Allen, 9 A.D.2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (1959). Here the Appellate
Division declared:
"Every citizen has the legal capacity to sue every other citizen excepting only
when prevented by such personal disabilities as infancy or adjudicated incompe-
tency; and the right exists without reference to the title or status of the plaintiff
or of the defendant. A person having a capacity to bring a lawsuit may bring it,
as Judge Vann noted, and get the defendant 'into court by the service of a sum-
mons' even if he had 'no cause of action.' Thus we think plaintiffs could bring
this lawsuit or any other lawsuit against these defendants or any other defendants
whom the summons of the court could reach."
4 Lesser v. Ringelheim, 154 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (1956). See also Mulligan v. Bond &
Mortgage Guarantee Co., 193 App. Div. 741, 184 N.Y.S. 429 (1st Dept. 1920).
5 Rothchild v. Chemacid S. A., 266 A.D. 1017, 44 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1943).
6 MacAffer v. Boston & M. R.R., 242 App. Div. 140, 273 N.Y.S. 679 (1934), rev. on
oth. gr., 268 N.Y. 400, 197 N.E. 328 (1935). Here the Appellate Division declared at
p. 685-86:
"The phrase 'legal capacity to sue,' as used in a code provision, means that
plaintiff must be free from general disability, such as infancy or insanity, or,
if he sues as a representative, that he shall possess the character in which he
sues. It has been stated, generally, that every natural person of lawful age has
legal capacity to sue, and that persons under no legal disability, such as infancy,
lunacy, or the like, have a legal capacity to sue ..... Thus, where an associa-
tion has no corporate existence either de jure or de facto, and there is no estop-
pel, it cannot do any act whatever as a legal entity. It cannot .. . sue or be sued."
7 Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 154, 147 N.E. 703, 704 (1925).
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agreements referred to. I do not so understand the meaning of
the expression-lack of "legal capacity to sue"-as used in Rules
106 and 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice. Assuming, as claimed
by the defendants, that an assignment of her stock and rights is
explicitly and plainly shown in the basic agreements relied upon
by the plaintiff and annexed to the pleading, then the defect to
be urged is that the complaint does not state a cause of action
in favor of the one who is suing, the alleged assignor-not that
the plaintiff does not have legal capacity to sue. Legal incapacity,
as properly understood, generally envisages a defect in legal status,
not a lack of a cause of action in one who is sui juris.8
Of course, it is true that the law of the forum generally, and absent
federal compulsion, governs who are the proper parties to a lawsuit. But
in so determining, it must necessarily refer to the law of the place which
created the substantive right. This is clearly brought out in a decision of
the Appellate Division, First Department, which held in one case as
follows:
The complaint alleges that under the laws of Massachusetts a
note made in the presence of attesting witnesses may be sued on by
the original payee within twenty years after the cause of action
arose. It further alleges that the foregoing provisions of the Massa-
chusetts law mean that such suit may be brought in the name of
the original payee for the benefit of the present holder.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. . . He contends
that the law of the forum determines who are the proper parties
to bring a suit .... We agree with defendant's contentions that the
law of the forum applies to such matters. . . . Nevertheless, we
deem the present complaint sufficient. Liberally construed, the
pleading states facts from which it might be inferred that the
foreign law created substantive rights rather than a remedy.9
The substantive question as to who owns a claim depends upon
whether the assignee obtained good title in the place where it was assigned.
In Peterson v. Chemical Bank,10 the New York Court of Appeals held as
follows:
It follows that the plaintiff presented himself to the Superior Court
as the owner by purchase and assignment of the debt against the
defendant .... the validity of that title depended upon the law
of Connecticut [where the transfer was made]."
8 Ohlstein v. Hillcrest Paper Co., 24 Misc. 2d 212, 195 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1959).
Accord: Harris v. Averick, 24 Misc. 2d 1039, 204 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1960).
9 W. B. Dunn Co. v. Corwin, 258 App. Div. 609, 17 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1940).
10 32 N.Y. 21 (1865).
11 Id. at 46.
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If the assignee obtains good title in the place of assignment, the uni-
form rule is that he may sue in his own name in any forum. In a leading
case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
Whenever, however, by the lex loci contractus, the legal title passes,
the holder of such legal title may sue in his own name in whatever
forum he may bring his suit. The rule is recognized by Judge Story,
in his Conflict of Laws .... In discussing the subject of transfers of
choses in action, not valid by the law of the place where suit is
brought, but valid by the law of the place where made, he says:
"In such case it would seem that the more correct rule would be
that the lex loci contractus ought to govern. Under such circum-
stances, to deny the legal effect of the endorsement, is to construe
the obligation, force and effect of a contract made in one place by
the law of another. It is not a question as to the form of the remedy,
but as to the right."' 2
According to these authorities, the question of legal capacity to sue is
not only not related to the ownership of the claim, but is not involved at all.
Whether the corporation is a proper party depends on whether it owns the
claim, but this in turn depends on the validity and consequences of the
successorship by the corporation of the rights of its predecessor in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Accordingly, the question involved is substantive, and
not procedural, and the judge was in error in treating it as a procedural
matter governed by the law of whatever forum the plaintiff sued in.
(2) The governing law
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 377, states: "The place of wrong
is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place." Section 378 states: "The law of the place of wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury." Since in libel
cases the last act or event necessary to make an act or liable is publication,
it necessarily follows that the law of each jurisdiction into which the publi-
12 Levy v. Levy, 78 Pa. 507, 509 (1875). In Lanigan v. North, 69 Ark. 62, 63 S.W.
62, 64 (1901), the court likewise declared:
"Again, it is said that the accounts against the bank were not assignable, under
our own statute, and that the assignors should have been made parties. But
these debts were contracted by the bank in California, and were assigned to
the plaintiff in that state. It was shown that such claims were assignable under
the laws of that state. If they were assigned in that state, the assignment vested
the legal title or ownership in the assignee, and he could bring an action in
his own name either there or here. We look to the law of California in order
to determine the effect of an assignment made in that state, and the effect of
the assignment there was, as before stated, to vest the legal title to those choses
in action in the plaintiff North. Being the owner of the legal title, he was,
under our statute, as well as that of California, the real party in interest, and
could bring this suit in his own name; for whenever by the lex loci contractus
the assignment passes the legal title the holder of such legal title may sue in
his own name in whatever forum he may bring his suit."
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cation is circulated governs as to damages suffered in the jurisdiction. As
Harper and James say: "The logic of this situation leads to the result that
a defamatory article in a national magazine is governed by the law of every
state in the Union if the place of publication is the proper law, as was
early held.' I s
Those jurisdictions which follow the "single publication rule" as does
New York hold that the law of each of the states into which a libel circu-
lates governs the case insofar as damages are sustained therein in respect to
all substantive law, both as to cause of action and defenses.' 4 It appears that
New York also follows this rule. x5
The identical result is reached via another route. Since the tort is
governed by the state in which the last act necessary for completion is done,
and since the last act necessary for a libel is publication, each state governs
insofar as the material was published in that state, and in the non-single
publication rule states, an independent cause of action is created and is
governed by that state's law which New York State will recognize under
traditional conflict of laws theory, although that state's law is different from
New York's internal law.' 6 Indeed, although New York, as the forum, may
constitutionally apply its procedure, including its statute of limitations,
17
it would appear that New York is constitutionally compelled to apply
sister-state substantive law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.' 8
The result of the foregoing analysis is that if the law governing the libel
is used to determine the validity of the successorship or assignment to the
corporation, the consequences will be chaos. The law of each state into
which the libel has circulated may be different as to successorship and
assignment, and as a result there may be as many different plaintiffs as
there are states or foreign countries into which the publication circulated.
At best, New York could only determine the effect of the successorship in
respect to that part of the cause of action accruing in New York; as to
other states, it would be unconstitutional for New York to attempt to do
13 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, § 30.7 (1956).
14 Hartman v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 134-5 (3rd Cir., 1947); Ettore v. Philco
Television Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485, 494 (3rd Cir., 1956); Howser v. Pearson, 95 F. Supp.
936 (D.C.D.C., 1951); O'Reilly v. Curtis Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 344 (D. Mass., 1940); Neiman-
Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y., 1952). In Brewster v. Boston Herald Traveler
Corp., 188 F. Supp. 565, 577 (D. Mass., 1960), it was held: "In short, the parties are
entitled to have separate instructions of law, if necessary, and separate calculations of
damages, if appropriate, first for the District of Columbia, second, for Maine, and third
for Massachusetts."
15 Hartman v. Time, Inc., supra, was cited with approval in Gregoire v. G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 123, 81 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1948). This is persuasive that New
York follows the Third Circuit's rule.
16 Andretto Bank v. Goodbody, 20 Misc. 2d 392, 194 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1959), aff'd, 10
A.D.2d 696, 197 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1960).
17 Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon, 299 F.2d
212, 214-5 (2d Cir., 1962).
Is Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
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so, since it has no contacts other than that of being the forum state.19 Thus,
application of this rule would compel the splitting of a single cause of
action for libel among several plaintiffs, a result contrary to the strong
policy of New York's "single publication rule."20
Nor can the "domicile" of the unincorporated organization be used.
Since the A.P.F.C. had members in more than one state, it is impossible to
say that it was domiciled in any one state. If the laws of all of the states
wherein it had members are used, the same confusion would result. Mani-
festly, it is desirable that a uniform rule to determine the force and validity
of the successorship be found.
The capacity of the corporation to take the claim is governed by the
law of the place of incorporation. 21 The same rule applies to unincorpo-
rated groups; capacity to take is determined by domicile.22 Indeed, it is
doubtful whether any other rule would comport with Full Faith and Credit
requirements. 23
The validity and effect of an assignment of a contract claim, whether
voluntarily or by operation of law, is governed by the law of the place
where the assignment is made.24 This is true although the claim is located
elsewhere. In Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez,2 5 it was held that the
validity of the assignment of the cause of action was governed by the law
of the place of assignment, which was where the assignee was domiciled
and where the assignment took place, although the cause of action was
dearly in another jurisdiction. And in Mogul v. Jenkins Bros.,26 the New
York Appellate Term held that "the question of the validity of the transfer
of a claim ... is governed by the law of the place where the assignment is
made." Thus, even if the assignment would be invalid if executed in New
York, like any other contract, New York courts will give effect to it-if valid
where made.2
19 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
20 See Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, supra, n.15.
21 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 165.3 (1936); George v. Holstein Friesian Assn., 238
N.Y. 513, 522, 144 N.E. 776 (1924). In St. Johns v. Andrews Institute for Girls, 191 N.Y.
254, 267, 83 N.E. 981 (1908), the court held: "The validity of the provisions of a will
relating to a corporation devisee holding, investing, accumulating, and applying the
property devised is for the courts of the domicile of the corporation to determine." It
might be noted that the law of the District of Columbia is the same. Williams v.
Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary, 198 F.2d 595, 596 (C.A.D.C., 1952) cert. den.,
344 U.S. 864 (1952).
22 In re Idem's Will, 256 App. Div. 124, 8 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1939), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 756,
21 N.E.2d 522 (1939).
23 Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
24 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, §§ 350, 351; New England Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Spence, 104 F.2d 665 (2d Cir., 1939).
25 [1927] 1 K.B. 669 (C.A.).
26 203 Misc. 635, 120 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1953).
27 City National Bank v. Lake Construction Co., 227 App. Div. 85, 237 N.Y.S. 58
(1st Dept., 1929); First National Bank v. Fleitmann, 168 App. Div. 75, 153 N.Y.S. 869
(1st Dept., 1915).
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No reason appears why the same rule should not apply to assignments
of tort claims as applies to assignments of contract claims. The few cases
dealing with such assignments so hold. In El Paso & S. W. Co. v. Hudspeth,28
a cause of action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, which con-
tained no provision permitting or denying the right to assign, was involved.
The court held: "The cause of action was transitory, the assignment was made
in Texas and its validity is governed by the laws of that state."' ' Likewise,
in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,30 the United States Supreme
Court recognized New York's statutory assignment under the Workmen's
Compensation Act although a similar assignment in the District of Colum-
bia would have violated a federal anti-assignment act forbidding the as-
signment of claims against the government. And by way of analogy, the
New York courts have held that a statute where a contract is made governs
liability for a tort occurring in another state.31 Thus, the transfer is
governed by the law where made.
It is manifest that the members of the A.P.F.C., in agreement that the
corporation should succeed to the collective rights of the unincorporated
group, intended such succession to occur at the time and place of incorpo-
ration. Thus, succession can be said to have occurred in the District of
Columbia at the moment of incorporation. It is clear that in the absence
of evidence of intent to be bound by some other law, by incorporating in
the District of Columbia the group members may be presumed to have
intended to be bound by District of Columbia law as to the rights of the
new corporation and its succession to the rights of its predecessor unin-
corporated group. Thus, applying Auten v. Auten,32 District of Columbia
law governs the validity of the succession or assignment.
With the two principal incidents of succession determined by District
of Columbia law, it seems logical to hold that all other incidents, including
the assignability of the claim, are governed by that law. To determine dif-
ferent aspects of what is essentially one transaction by different laws is
undesirable and would lead to confusion in the affairs of the corporation.
The transfer of a claim from an unincorporated predecessor to a
newly formed corporation is in many respects similar to the transfer by
will of personal property which, no matter where located, is by universal
rule governed by the law of the testator's domicile to promote uniformity,
and convenience.33 It is also similar to the well-settled New York and
general rule that the law which creates the corporation governs the conduct
28 255 S.W. 772 (rex. Civ. App., 1923).
29 Id. at 774.
30 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
31 Lamb v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Misc. 2d 236, 161 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1941) aff'd,
263 App. Div. 859, 32 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1942).
32 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
33 Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N.Y. 30, 39, 35 N.E. 407 (1893).
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of its internal affairs.3 4 The reason for the rule is that a single law for in-
ternal affairs of corporations is needed for certainty and ease.3 5 So here,
without a single rule, the corporation would never know which claims of
its predecessor it owned. Nothing but chaos would result.
The one New York Court of Appeals case in this area looks this way.
In Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard,3 6 the court said:
If the existence of the [foreign] corporation, its capacity to
sue, or the authority of its directors to represent it or to bring the
action is challenged, we look to the charter and the law of its
corporate domicile for the data upon which we may rest our deter-
mination of such questions. If it is claimed that the plaintiffs'
rights or property have passed to another, we examine the laws of
the particular jurisdiction which may regulate their transfer or
devolution.37 (Emphasis supplied)
The law of the corporation's domicile will be given effect even if
different from that of New York. New York recognizes special statutory
assignments or successorships for causes of action for personal injuries,85
and out-of-state jurisdictions which do not ordinarily recognize assignments
of tort claims have nonetheless given effect to such statutory assignments.89
Thus, one New Hampshire case declared:
If the award of compensation in New York had the effect under
the law there, not to extinguish the right of action through the loss
of property rights therein, but to permit its maintenance ...by
the insurer as its assignee, the rule of comity is equally available
to adopt the legal character of the transaction which it has where
it is entered into or takes place.40
The fact that New York may restrict assignments more than some other
states does not entitle the courts there to treat everything west of the Hud-
son as a legal wasteland. As Tufarella v. Erie Railroad Co.41 pointed out:
Since the statutory right to contribution is regarded in New Jersey
as being a substantive right and since it may there be enforced
under their procedural rule of court, we apprehend that we should
84 The authorities are fully collected in Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.,
1962), cert. den., 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
35 Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs, 58 Col. L. Rev. 1118,
1126-7 (1958), cited with approval in Hausman v. Buckley, supra, at 704, n.14.
36 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925).
37 Id. at 154-5, 147 N.E. at 704.
88 Workmen's Compensation Law, § 29(2). See Crawford v. Sullivan, 19 Misc. 2d
867, 189 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1959).
89 Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Ackerman Bros., 124 N.J.L. 187,
11 A.2d 52 (1940); Alexander v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D.C. Mich., 1944).
40 Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 AtL. 47, 49 (1931).
41 10 A.D.2d 525, 203 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1960).
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permit its enforcement here under our substantially similar proce-
dural provision .... The accident happened in New Jersey, and,
save for matters of purely procedural nature, the law of that State
is applicable. . . "We are not so provincial as to say that every
solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise
at home."42
(3) Successorship in the District of Columbia
The general rule as to successorship by a corporation of the rights of
its predecessor unincorporated organization is stated as follows: "If the
members of an association unanimously vote to incorporate it, the creation
of the corporation pursuant thereto ipso facto dissolves the association and
transfers its property and rights to the corporation."48 This rule is sup-
ported by a wealth of cases.44 The reason for the rule was set forth in
Citizens Mutual Fire & Lighting Ins. Co. v. Schoen45 as follows:
Its same officers remained in charge of its affairs. Its name, its mem-
bers, its business, the territory in which it operated, its purposes,
and the laws which governed it remained the same. No change
occurred except that a copy of its bylaws was filed in the office
of the Secretary of State and $10 of its money was paid to the
State Treasurer, in return for which it received a certificate of
incorporation. The change in the status of this company did not
affect the identity of the company or modify its purposes or method
of operation.... The obligations of the members to the company
did not cease when the change was made, but were carried into
the business of the company and became part of its assets, as did
all the other business of the company.46
Any other rule would result in manifest injustice, since if the old asso-
ciation were destroyed by merger, yet the new corporation did not take its
claims, neither could sue, and the cause of action would be lost for want
42 Id. at 531, quoting from Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E.
198 (1918).
48 7 C.J.S., Associations, § 9(6), p. 29 (1955).
44 Hope of Alabama Lodge of Odd Fellows v. Chambless, 212 Ala. 444, 103 So. 54,
55-6 (1925); Street v. Pitts, 238 Ala. 531, 192 So. 258, 260 (1939); Town of Gravette v.
Veach, 186 Ark. 544, 54 S.W.2d 704, 706 (1932); Security First National Bank v. Cooper,
62 Cal. App. 2d 653, 145 P.2d 722, 731 (1943); First Russian National Organization v.
Zuraw, 89 Conn. 616, 94 Adt. 976 (1915); Red Polled Cattle v. Red Polled Cattle, '108
Iowa 105, 78 N.W. 803, 804-5 (1899); Bancroft v. Cook, 264 Mass. 343, 162 N.E. 691 (1928);
Proprietors of St. Luke's Church v. Slack, 61 Mass. 226 (1851); Keith & Perry Coal Co. v.
Bingham, 97 Mo. 196, 213, 10 S.W. 32 (1888); Attorney-General v. Dublin, 38 N.H. 459,
575 (1859); New Market v. Smart, 45 N.H. 87, 100-2 (1863); Witowski v. Wojdechoski,
84 N.H. 262, 149 AtI. 506 (1930); Century M. E. Church v. Parker, 43 N.J. Eq. 307, 12
Atl. 142 (1888); Associate Alumni v. General Theological Seminary, 163 N.Y. 417, 57
N.E. 626 (1900); Architector Co. v. Slomon, 192 Misc. 319, 80 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (1948);
Spiritual & Philosophical Temple v. Vincent, 127 Wis. 93, 105 N.W. 1026 (1906).
45 105 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. App., 1937).
46 Id. at 46.
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of a proper plaintiff, although substantial damage had been caused in-
tentionally.4 7
Although no District of Columbia case has squarely passed on the
point, the District follows the general common-law as to associations.48
Indeed, at the time of the libel, which concerned an attempted incorpora-
tion in New York, it appears that District law would have considered the
A.P.F.C. a de facto corporation, and the cause of action continued in it
when it assumed full corporate status. 49
The power of a non-profit District of Columbia corporation to take
property is very broad. The District of Columbia Code provides:
Upon filing their certificate the persons who shall have signed and
acknowledged the same and their associates and successors shall be
a body politic and corporate, and by the name stated in such cer-
tificate; ... and may take, receive, hold, and convey real and per-
sonal estate necessary for the purposes of the society as stated in
their certificate, and other real and personal property the income
from which shall be applied to the purposes of such society. 50
Under federal law, it has been repeatedly held that choses in action are
"property,"51 even if they are not assignable.52 In Proper v. Clark,53 the
United States Supreme Court declared:
By the order appointing a permanent receiver, the claim of AKM
against ASCAP was directed to be transferred from AKM to the
47 An analogous situation is pointed out in Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannau,
219 Cal. 184, 25 P.2d 839, 840-2 (1933). Here the court declared:
"The amusement company built the pier. Thereafter the holding company
was organized and built the ballroom. The representations upon which recovery
is sought were made to officers of the amusement company, before the holding
company was organized. Hence, defendants argue, the holding company has
no cause of action because no representations were made to it, or relied upon
by it, in connection with the building of the ballroom. They conclude that
since the amusement company did not build the ballroom, and the holding
company was not defrauded, there can be no recovery by either party for the
loss incurred as a result of the construction of the ballroom .....
"It would indeed be remarkable if the law proved so barren that legal princi-
ple could not be found to avoid such a result. It is, of course, obvious that the
whole matter would have been settled by an express assignment of the cause of
action for fraud by the amusement company to the holding company ..... A cor-
poration comes into existence, as an artificial person, at a particular moment of
time, but its rights and liabilities are largely dependent upon prior events."
48 Rose Campbell Mission v. Richardson, 64 App. D.C. 21, 73 F.2d 661, 663 (1934)_
49 Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137 U.S. 568, 571-2 (1890).
50 District of Columbia Code, Title 29, § 602, Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1284,
Ch. 854, § 600, as amended by Act of April 20, 1932, 47 Stat. 87, Ch. 121.
51 Farbenfabriken v. Sterling Drug Co., 251 F.2d 300, 301 (3rd Cir., 1958); Com-
missioner v. Kellogg, 119 F.2d 115, 117 (9th Cir., 1941); Thomas v. Winslow, 11 F. Supp.
839, 840 (W.D.N.Y., 1935); In re Berthoud, 231 Fed. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y., 1916).
52 Bank of California v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 428, 432 (9th Cir., 1943).
53 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
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petitioner. From ASCAP's point of view, it was a debt; from AKM's
a claim. The shift of obligation . . . was a transaction that in-
volved "property. .. "
Accordingly, under District of Columbia law, the corporation had the
power to, and did, succeed to the cause of action for libel against its prede-
cessor unincorporated association.
(4) Assignment in the District of Columbia
Although the transaction here was one of successorship and not as-
signment, and although, as is more fully shown below, even if the trans-
action were characterized as an assignment, it would be an assignment of
a claim for property damage and accordingly traditionally assignable under
common law, nevertheless, it is relevant to note that under District of
Columbia law even claims of libel against an individual person are now
assignable. Thus, the transaction, no matter how viewed, was valid where
carried out.
The District of Columbia has no statute on the point, 55 and common
law is the only guide. The general rule is stated in C.J.S. as follows:
So, by the weight of authority, statutes providing for the survival,
to the executor or administrator, of causes of action for personal
torts have been construed as rendering such rights of action as-
signable.5
The rule that assignability depends upon survival is supported by a
wealth of cases.57 Thus, in a closely analogous case, a claim for fraudulent
54 Id. at 479-480.
55 The Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1256, Ch. 854, § 433 is, of course, irrelevant.
Prior to that statute, although assignments of claims were generally recognized, Judson
v. Corcoran, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 612, 614 (1855), such assignments were only given effect
in equity. Looney v. District of Columbia, 113 U.S. 258, 261 (1885); Spain v. Hamilton's
Adm'r, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 604, 624 (1864). Hence, although an assignee could sue in his
own name in equity, Young v. Kelly, 3 App. D.C. 296 (1894); he could not sue at law
except in the name of his assignor. Karrick v. Wetmore, 22 App. D.C. 487 (1903); Davis
v. Wyer, 7 Fed. Cas. 191, No. 3,660 (C.C.D.C., 1808). It is well-settled that the only
effect of the statute was procedural, to permit the assignee to sue in his own name in
a specified class of cases, and that the substantive question of what claims were assign-
able or in what manner they had to be assigned was left unaffected. District of Columbia
v. Hamilton National Bank, 76 A.2d 60, 64 (D.C. Mun. App., 1950); Compton v. Atwell,
86 A.2d 623 (D.C. Mun. App., 1952); Koehne v. Harvey, 45 A.2d 780, 783 (D.C. Mun.
App., 1946). Such substantive-law questions are still determined by common-law. Meyer
v. Washington Times Co., 64 App. D.C. 218, 76 F.2d 988 (1935); cert. den., 295 U.S. 734
(1935). The modem procedural rules, such as Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and its local District of Columbia counterpart, have made it possible for all
assignees to sue in their own name and rendered the statute obsolete.
56 6 C.J.S., Assignment, § 33, pp. 1081-2.
57 McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11, 15 (W.D.S. Car., 1941) ("A right
of action for personal injuries is assignable where it would, on the death of the assignor,
survive to his legal representative"); Momand v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F.
Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Okla., 1941) ("Assignability and survivability are convertible terms');
Deatsch v. Fairfield, 27 Ariz. 387, 233 Pac. 887, 891 (1925) ("The test of assignability of
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representations made to individuals was held to have been validly assigned
to a corporation formed afterwards by them where the corporation was
interested in the common venture, the court saying: "the test of assign-
ability of a chose in action is whether it will survive and pass to the per-
sonal representative. If it will survive it can be assigned."5 8
The rule of survival as the test of assignability was the law of New
York prior to being changed by statute.59 It is also the law of the District
of Columbia. In Hutchinson v. Brown,60 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia declared that "the general test of assignability seems
to be, whether by the laws in force in the particular jurisdiction, the action
is one that will survive." 6'
Prior to 1948, actions for personal injuries or injury to reputation did
not survive in the District of Columbia. 62 In that year, Congress passed
a law which deleted the exceptions of personal injury and injury to repu-
tation from those causes of action which would survive. 63 As the House
of Representatives was told prior to the passage of the law, "this provides
for the survivorship of tort actions."64
a chose in action is whether it will survive and pass to the personal representative");
Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625, 146 N.W. 830, 836 (1914); Francis v. Burnett,
84 Ky. 23, 35 (1886); Final v. Backus, 18 Mich. 218, 231 (1869); Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co.
v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 161 Mich., 181, 126 N.W. 56, 60 (1910); J. H. Leavenworth
& Son v. Hunter, 150 Miss. 245, 116 So. 593, 596 (1928); Wells v. Edwards Hotel & City
Ry. Co., 96 Miss. 191, 50 So. 628 (1909); Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 AtI. 47, 49
(1931) ("A cause of action for personal injuries, if not terminable by death . . . is gen-
erally assignable under local law"); Goings v. Black, 164 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio, 1960); Rorvik
v. North Pacific Lumber Co., 99 Ore. 58, 195 Pac. 163, 167 (1921) ("Survivorship is the
test of assignability'); Haymes v. Halliday, 151 Tenn. 115, 268 S.W. 130 (1925); Carre v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 208 Tenn. 403, 346 S.W.2d 259, 262 (1961) ("The test of assign-
ability of a right of action ex delicto . . .is made to depend upon whether or not it is
survivable"); Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Ginther, 96 Tex. 295, 72 S.W. 166 (1903);
McCloskey v. San Antonio Traction Co., 192 S.W. 1116, 1119 (Tex. Civ. App., 1917) ("The
test of the assignability was whether or not the claim would pass as an asset to the
legal representative of the assignor at his death"); Lehmann v. Deuster, 95 Wis. 185, 70
N.W. 170 (1897); Samuel Meyers, Inc. v. Ogden Shoe Co., 173 Wis. 317,. 181 N.W. 306,
307 (1921) ("The test of assignability is whether the action would survive").
58 Shepard v. Cal-Nine Farms, 252 F.2d 884, 885 (9th Cir., 1958).
59 'Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N.Y. 322, 332-6 (1855).
60 8 App. D.C. 157 (1896).
61 Id. at 163.
062 Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1227, Ch. 854, § 235: "On the death of any persont
in whose favor or against whom a right of action may have accrued for any cause-
except an injury to the person or to the reputation, said right of action shall survive in
favor of or against the legal representatives of the deceased; but no right of action for-
an injury to the person . . . or to the reputation, shall so survive."
63 Act of June 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 487, Ch. 508, § 1 (Public Law 677 of 1948): "Section
235 of the Act entitled 'An act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia'
approved March 3, 1901, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 235,
On the death of any person in whose favor or against whom a right of action may
have accrued for any cause prior to his death, said right of action shall survive in
favor of or against the legal representative of the deceased."
64 94 Cong. Rec. 7456 (1948). See also Senate Rept. No. 374, An Act to Amend
Sections 235 and 327 of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia, 80th Cong., 1st
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Moreover, in Soroka v. Beloff, 6 5 Judge Holtzoff, author of the leading
treatise on federal practice, stated:
It seems to follow that rights of action for injury to the person
or for libel and slander, as well as all other rights of action,
now survive in favor of or against the legal representatives of the
deceased. 66
This case has not been overruled, and was subsequently cited with
approval.8 7 Thus, in the District of Columbia, all libel claims, both those
causing personal injury and property damage, may be assigned.
(5) The Effect of a Foreign Succession in New York
The justice at Special Term held, in effect, that the plaintiff could
not sue in a New York forum because the transaction, carried out else-
where, could not have been entered into in New York, and hence it vio-
lated New York's public policy. As has already been shown above, a mere
difference in law does not constitute a violation of the public policy of the
forum, let alone one strong enough to warrant denial of rights acquired
out of the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, assuming this point arguendo, the
justice was still in error since New York corporations could enter into the
same transaction, and the forum cannot deem a foreign statute or trans-
action offensive when it has the same rule for domestic transactions. 68
Section 12 of the New York Membership Corporations Law provides:
An unincorporated association, society, league or club, not organ-
ized for pecuniary profit, may be incorporated under this chapter
for the purposes for which it was organized .... and thereupon
the members of such association, society, league or club shall be
members of the corporation so created, and all property owned by
or held for it shall belong to and vest in the corporation, subject
to all existing incumbrances and claims as if incorporation had
not taken place.
Under the above section, it has several times been held that the new
corporation succeeds to causes of action. In Associated Alumni v. General
Theological Seminary,69 the Appellate Division, First Department said:
Sess. (1948), which stated: "The purpose of the bill is to permit the survivorship of a
cause of action for personal injuries to run both in favor and against the estate of the
decedent who in his lifetime caused or received such personal injuries." See also H.R.
Rep. No. 2209, An Act Amending Sections 235 and 327 of the Code of Laws for the
District of Columbia, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948): "The purpose of this bill is to permit
causes of action for personal injuries to run both in favor and against the estate of the
decedent who in his lifetime caused or received such personal injuries."
65 93 F. Supp. 642 (D.C.D.C., 1950).
66 Id. at 643.
67 Coleman v. Moore, 108 F. Supp. 425, 427 (D.C.D.C., 1952).
65 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
69 26 App. Div. 144, 49 N.Y.S. 745 (1898).
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The action taken by the unincorporated association was sufficient
of itself to transfer to the plaintiff, when incorporated, all its
rights. At the annual meeting of the association in 1899, a com-
mittee, appointed for that purpose, was directed to take all neces-
sary proceedings to incorporate the association; and in obedience
to this instruction, proceedings were taken which finally resulted
in the incorporation of the plaintiff. This of itself was sufficient
to vest in the plaintiff all the title and interest which the associa-
tion had or to the fund.70
On appeal, the Court of Appeals specifically upheld this holding, saying:
We hold with that court that the plaintiff is the successor in rights
and interest of the voluntary association which gave the fund to
the defendant.7 '
Several other cases have likewise held that the corporation succeeds to its
predecessor's choses in action.72
The word "property" in the foregoing statute would appear to in-
clude all choses in action or claims for relief. General Construction Law,
§ 38 provides that "the term property includes . . . . personal property."
Section 39 provides: "The term personal property includes .... things in
action." Under these sections, and in a wide variety of circumstances, causes
of action for personal injury have repeatedly been held to be property.73
Thus, in Wilson v. Aedian Co.,74 it was held that a chose in action for
fraud was "property." In Bennett v. Bennett,75 the Court of Appeals de-
clared:
The cause of action for personal injury to a married woman ....
belonged to her at common law .... So in the case of an absolute
divorce such rights of action remained the property of the wife. 76
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Barry v. Village of Port Jervis,77 it was held:
70 Id. at 750.
71 Associated Alumni v. General Theological Seminary, 163 N.Y. 417, 420, 57 N.E.
626 (1900).
72 Community Volunteer Fire Co. v. City National Bank, 171 Misc. 1027, 14 N.Y.S.2d
306, 309 (1939); Tioga County General Hospital v. Tidd, 164 Misc. 273, 298 N.Y.S. 460,
474 (1937).
73 In Smith v. New York Consolidated Stage Co., 28 How. Prac. 277, 279-280 (N.Y.
Co., 1865), Justice Cardozo, father of Chief Judge Cardozo, held: "But 'choses in action'
are covered by the term 'property' which is a most comprehensive word." And in Re
Westbrook's Estate, 228 App. Div. 549, 551, 240 N.Y.S. 301, 304 (1930), it was held:
"This claim [for personal injuries] was property, therefore, which the decedent owned
at her death. It passed by her will and was properly subject to tax."
74 64 App. Div. 337, 72 N.Y.S. 150, 153 (1901), aft'd, 170 N.Y. 618, 63 N.E. 1123 (1902).
75 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
78 Id. at 593.
77 64 App. Div. 268, 72 N.Y.S. 104 (1901).
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The right of action which vested in the plaintiff under the con-
stitution and the common law [for personal injuries due to negli-
gence] . . . . is property. It has value.78
Speaking of the libel of an unincorporated association in Kirkman v.
Westchester Newspapers,79 Judge Desmond declared: "Is not that reputa-
tion the common property of its members as such?"8 0 Accordingly, a cause
of action for libel is "property" to which New York membership corpora-
tions would succeed.
Any other rule would produce a pandora's box of mischief. If an un-
incorporated association which was formed into a corporation passed some
of its claims to the new corporation but not others, constant confusion
and litigation among members would occur as to who owned which claims.
Moreover, the demise of the unincorporated group might wipe out its tort
claims completely, especially if by the time they were sought to be en-
forced the former members had died or resigned.81
Such a construction of Section 12 of the Membership Corporations
Law would work an equally undesirable hardship on claimants against the
unincorporated group. That section automatically vests in the corporation
all property of the association, and makes it "subject to all existing .. .
claims as if incorporation had not taken place." If an unincorporated
group had contract or tort claims against it, and its only substantial prop-
erty were its own tort claims against others, by incorporating it would
force the claimants against it to proceed against the newly formed cor-
poration which had no property to satisfy any judgment, while the unin-
corporated group reduced its own tort claims to judgment and distributed
the proceeds thus obtained free from the claims of creditors whose recourse
against the new corporation was worthless. Such an absurdity should not
be fostered by any restrictive reading of the word "property" in Section 12,
even in the light of Personal Property Law, § 41.1(1). It cannot be pre-
sumed that the legislature, in enacting the latter statute, intended the mis-
chief of divided corporate succession to occur.8 2 Instead, where a particular
statutory provision is inconsistent with a general provision, the particular
will be considered as an exception to the generals 3 Accordingly, the cor-
78 Id. at 114. In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918),
Judge Cardozo said: "A right of action is property. If a foreign statute gives the right,
the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing to help the
plaintiff in getting what belongs to him."
79 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E.2d 919 (1942).
80 Id. at 380.
81 The general rule is that an unincorporated association which ceases to function
as such is no longer in existence. Rose Campbell Mission v. Richardson, supra, n.48.
Thus, the libel claim might be lost for want of a proper plaintiff even though the tort
was intended to cause damage and did so.
82 Breen v. Board of Trustees, 229 N.Y. 8, 19, 85 N.E.2d 161 (1949).
83 People ex rel. Knoblauch v. Warden, 216 N.Y. 154, 156-7, 110 N.E. 451 (1915);
Britton v. Slater, 198 Misc. 1, 4, 99 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1950).
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poration would have succeeded to the rights of its predecessor had it been
incorporated in New York,s4 and the same result under District of Co-
lumbia law cannot be deemed to violate New York policy.
(6) The Effect of the Foreign Assignment in New York
The New York judge characterized the succession here as an assign-
ment. While as shown above, this characterization is not correct, never-
theless, even if it were correct, if New York would permit this transaction,
its occurrence in a foreign jurisdiction cannot be deemed to violate New
York's public policy. Thus, even if Section 12 of the Membership Corpora-
tions Law did not form an exception to Personal Property Law, § 41.1(1),
the result would still be the same if the latter statute was not intended to
cover transfers of claims of the type here involved.
New York Personal Property Law, § 41.1(1), makes "personal injury"
claims unassignable in New York, and General Construction Law, § 37-a
includes libel as personal injury. However, when read against its common
law background, it is clear that only libels of natural persons are meant,
and not libels of artificial entities which can, by their nature, cause only
property damage.
The definition of "personal injury" in General Construction Law,
§ 37-a, goes back to 1876, and comes from common law.85 The general
common law rule has been stated as follows:
More accurately, this rule [against assignment of tort causes of
action] . . . is limited to torts in the nature of personal wrongs.
The real test, so far as tort actions are concerned, seems to have
84 In Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Shapiro, 9 N.Y.2d
376, 174 N.E.2d 487 (1961), the New York Court of Appeals impliedly recognized that the
corporation could succeed to at least some of the personal rights of the prior unincorpo-
rated group. In that case, the Attorney-General argued that "insofar as the proceeding
relates to section 10 of the Membership Corporations Law, petitioner is not the real party
in interest within the meaning of section 210 of the Civil Practice Act and has not the
legal capacity to sue for the benefit of others within the meaning of section 195 of the
Civil Practice Act." 9 N.Y.2d at 378 (reporters notes). The argument proceeded that since
only the corporation was suing as the petitioner, it could not represent its New York
members in respect to their application under Sec. 10, but only its own application, and
since the members or their "president" or "treasurer" was not joined in the proceeding,
but the petition merely stated that the A.P.F.C. was suing for itself and its New York
subscribers, it followed that no consideration could be given to the claims of the New
York subscribers. The A.P.F.C. argued, however, that since it was incorporated in the
District of Columbia, it derived its powers from Congress, that New York must recognize
these powers, and that regardless of New York law, it could represent its members where
there was a close connection, under such cases as N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958), and accordingly the claims of the New York subscribers had to be given considera-
tion as well as its own. Judge Foster, in his opinion, stated that the appeal involved
applications "made by petitioner-appellant and its New York subscribers," thereby re-
jecting the Attorney-General's argument, at least by implication. See 9 N.Y.2d at 379,
174 N.E.2d at 488. Thereupon, the Attorney-General made a motion for reargument
limited to this point alone, which was denied. See 11 N.Y.2d 662, 180 N.E.2d 898 (1962).
85 In re Fahys, 18 F. Supp. 529, 530 (S.D.N.Y., 1937).
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been whether the injury on which the cause of action was based
affected property rights, or affected the person alone.8 6
This was the common law rule in New York. In Smith v. Endicott-Johnson
Corp.,8 7 the court held: "The general rule is that all rights of action in
tort, which do not apply to the person strictly, but are for injury to one's
property, or estate, are assignable."8 8 And in Keeler v. Dunham,8 9 the
Appellate Division, First Department declared:
The question, therefore, comes down to whether or not an action
for a deceit which has caused damage is a personal injury within
section 1910 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I think it is not. The
plaintiff's person has not been injured by this fraud, which has
resulted in a loss to him of $6,000 . .. for the purpose of re-
dressing the wrong with the least possible complications, the sev-
eral rights of action were consolidated in the plaintiffs, who con-
stituted the committee, and the action brought in a forum where
redress for the wrong could be had in a single action. We think
this course was commendable, and that it was better to treat this
question and dispose of it in one action rather than to multiply
it by eighteen. No law interposes to prevent such a proceeding;
on the contrary, it supports it.90
The libel of an unincorporated association injures its goodwill. Good-
will is property.91 The courts have long protected the goodwill inherent
in the name of unincorporated and incorporated non-profit groups by en-
joining others from using their names.92
In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Menin,98 it was held that goodwill
was property under New York law which inhered in the name of the cor-
poration, and that when the corporation went into bankruptcy, the good-
will might be sold and transferred in bankruptcy, and the corporation might
be stripped in bankruptcy, unlike the individual, of the right to do busi-
ness under its old name to protect the purchaser of the goodwill.
86 Monrand v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D.
Okla., 1941).
87 199 App. Div. 194, 192 N.Y.S. 121 (1921).
88 Id. at 197.
89 114 App. Div. 94, 79 N.Y.S. 669 (1906).
90 Id. at 98-9. This case is manifestly inconsistent with American Restaurant China
Mfg. Ass'n v. Corning Glass Works, 24 Misc. 2d 634, 198 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1960), but being
in a higher court, it is controlling.
91 People ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Company v. Dederick, 161 N.Y. 195, 210, 55
N.E. 927 (1900); Matter of Dun, 40 Misc. 509, 510, 82 N.Y.S. 802 (1903); Matter of
Dupignac's Estate, 123 Misc. 21, 29, 204 N.Y.S. 273 (1924); Randall v. Baily, 23 N.Y.S.2d
173, 177 (1940).
92 Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks v. Improved Benevolent and Protective
Order of Elks, 205 N.Y. 459, 98 N.E. 756 (1912); Society of the War of 1812 v. Society of
the War of 1812, 46 App. Div. 568, 62 N.Y.S. 355 (1900); Matter of General Von Steuben
Bund, Inc., 159 Misc. 231, 235, 287 N.Y.S. 527 (1936).
93 115 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir., 1940).
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A libel against a corporation or unincorporated entity in New York
has always been looked upon as an injury to its property right in its good-
will. Speaking of libel in Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers,94 the Court
of Appeals declared:
Is not that reputation the common property of its members as
such? . .. this court said in 1906 of another corporate plaintiff
in an action for libel .. . that its right to be protected against
false and malicious statements affecting its property or credit was
beyond question and that a corporation need not allege or prove
specific damages, when the language complained of "is of so de-
famatory a nature as to directly affect credit and to occasion pe-
cuniary injury." 95 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, prior to New York Society for Suppression of Vice v. Mac-
Fadden Publications,96 where the Court of Appeals recognized that non-
profit organizations could be damaged in a pecuniary way by libels, the
Appellate Division, First Department, had twice held that non-profit or-
ganizations could not maintain actions for libel per se because they had
no "business" to be injured.97 As one case declared:
The conclusion follows that without the allegation of special dam-
ages the sufficiency of a complaint can be properly attacked when
the slander complained of did not affect credit or occasion pecu-
niary injury. Here the plaintiff did not engage in business, and
under section 2 of the Membership Corporations Law ...could
not. It therefore had no credit which could be affected; neither
could it suffer pecuniary loss within the meaning of the authori-
ties.98
A very clear case showing that the only injury an entity can suffer
from a libel is injury to property is Dulfy v. Gray,99 where the court held
that partners could sue for a libel independently of the libel to the part-
nership entity because "the only damages the partnership could have re-
covered was for the injury to their joint trade and business."'u °
94 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E.2d 919 (1942).
95 Id. at 380.
96 260 N.Y. 167, 183 N.E. 284 (1932).
97 See Stone v. Textile Examiners Employers' Assn., 137 App. Div. 655, 657, 122 N.Y.S.
460 (1910), holding: "the complaint fails to allege any injury whatever to the business or
credit of the association, on whose behalf the action is brought. The only allegation is
one of injury to the reputation of the plaintiff. Conceding the analogy between the rights
of an unincorporated association and those of a firm or partnership, it still remains the
law that even in the latter case partners cannot maintain a joint action for a libel or
slander unless it is alleged and proved that it tends to injure the business or credit of
the firm."
98 Electrical Board of Trade v. Sheehan, 210 N.Y.S. 127 (1925), aff'd, 214 App. Div.
712, 210 N.Y.S. 128 (1925).
99 52 Mo. 528 (1873).
100 Id. at 529.
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Since a libel of an organization is injury to its property in the good-
will of its name, when the name is transferred to a new corporation "it
is well settled that a cause of action growing out of injury to property
may be assigned especially when the assignee, as in this case, has acquired
title to the property."1 01 Thus, in Clark v. Lesher,102 it was held that "the
cause of action, being one for the fraudulent destruction of the goodwill
of the newspaper, arose out of the violation of a right of property, and it
was, therefore, assignable."' 03
A case closely on point is Hansen Mercantile Co. v. Wyman, Partridge
& Co.1 04 In this case, defendant was sued by plaintiff corporation for ma-
licious attachment. The defendant moved for judgment on the ground that
subsequent to the attachment plaintiff was adjudged a bankrupt and that
under federal law the trustee in bankruptcy became the statutory assignee
of the plaintiff as to all property or "injury to his property." The lower
court held for the plaintiff on the ground that this was a personal injury
and hence, under settled federal law, not assignable or assigned to the
trustee. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed. It said:
We think that the wrong here complained of was not an injury
to the person, but was an injury to property. . . .In the nature
of things, however, a corporation, a fictitious being, cannot bring
an action ex delicto for a purely personal tort, nor be awarded
purely personal damages. In its own capacity it cannot be seduced,
or falsely imprisoned, nor can it sue for breach of promise of mar-
riage, nor for personal injury. Damages for anguish of the soul
or pain of body it cannot recover.
More specifically, in malicious prosecution, the original form
of action was brought for the recovery of damages for injury to
the person, and often upon a state of facts which also gave rise to
a cause of action for false imprisonment. Obviously, no rational
extension of the law could confer on a corporation a similar right.
So mental suffering or impairment of health may be proper enough
elements of damage when an individual has been the object of the
malicious prosecution, but award of damages on their account to
the corporation is obviously impossible. Nonetheless, when in
reason a corporation has suffered harm because of the wrongful
putting of the law in motion, the courts have awarded it the
appropriate measure of damages. That wrong must in the nature
of things be to the property of the corporation, and not to its
person. Property, as thus used in fraud and defamation, as well
as in malicious prosecution, has been widely defined. It may in-
101 State Road Dept. v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298, 300 (1941).
102 46 Cal.2d 874, 299 P. 2d 865 (1941).
103 Id. at 870.
104 105 Minn. 491, 117 N.W. 926 (1908).
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clude goodwill and credit. The damages awarded a corporation
may be, as the plaintiff insists, within the rule that "in an action
on the case at common law for malicious attachment, when prop-
erly averred in the pleadings, the plaintiff may recover full com-
pensation for loss of credit, breaking up of business, loss of cus-
tomers and prospective profits, and injury to his reputation re-
sulting from the wrongful and malicious attachment .... ." In
the case at bar it might be that a cause of action would exist
because the injuries resulting from the attachment consisted in
the destruction of the business and of the credit, reputation, and
standing of the corporation and the driving away of customers.
These injuries are not to the person of the corporation but to
property. The tort was not a personal tort but a property tort....
Plaintiff rests on the proposition that the rights of action for
purely personal torts do not vest in the trustee in bankruptcy, as
for . . . slander . . . In none of these cases, however, was the
party complaining a corporation .... It has . . . been held that a
corporation may maintain an action for libel, so far as injury to
property is concerned, and not for damage to person and char-
acter, for which an individual may recover . . . "a corporation
has no personal character to be injured by the alleged slander-
ous allegation". . . . The authorities may be. fairly regarded
as having limited the right of recovery of a corporation to the
injury to its property. 05
The libel here did not injure any A.P.F.C. member personally, except
insofar as he was personally named. It simply injured the group name and
reputation. Goodwill built up by the labor of the organization's members,
as by getting up circulars, a program, or such other activities as non-profit
organizations engage in to attract new members and contributors, was
dissipated by the libels. Each member not named remained with his
personal reputation intact. Indeed, unless mentioned in the libel or re-
vealed through other sources a reader would not know who the individual
members were; they could start another group under a different name free
from the imputations of the libel. Only the group name, built up by
effort and expenditure, was damaged. This reputation or goodwill is the
common property of the organization upon which its lifeblood of members
and contributors depends. Accordingly, property damage and not personal
injury was inflicted, and General Construction Law, § 37-a, has no ap-
plication.
If Personal Property Law, § 41.1(1), has any policy basis at all, and
is not, as one judge declared, "a relic-like remnant of the laws of a social
system that one is happy is dead and buried,"' 06 it is designed to prevent
105 Id. at 927-8.
31 Richard v. National Transportation Corp., 158 Misc. 324, 326, 285 N.YS. 870,
873 (1936).
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unscrupulous persons from making a business of buying up personal in-
jury claims for a fraction of their true worth from needy persons who need
cash immediately and making an enormous profit when these claims are
liquidated by settlement or judgment while the injured persons who re-
ceived only a fraction of their true damages were thrown on public relief.
It is inconceivable that the legislature meant to prevent corporations which
have been formed out of preexisting organizations from prosecuting their
own claims in their new corporate name. Accordingly, since this libel claim
would have been assignable in New York, transfer in the District of Co-
lumbia can hardly be deemed to be offensive to any New York policy.
(7) Constitutionality of the Statute as Construed and Applied
Even, however, were the foregoing analysis erroneous, and were the
transaction to violate a public policy of New York, nevertheless, that state
is not free to abolish claims created elsewhere, or to deny access to its courts
for their enforcement. The United States Constitution limits a state's
power in this regard, and its inhibitions and mandates must be obeyed
regardless of local policies. In this case, the justice at Special Term has
so construed and applied Personal Property Law § 41.1(1), as to render it
unconstitutional as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.
Each of these will be taken up in turn.
(a) Due Process Clause. In the instant case, the transfer of the multi-
state libel claim took place in the District of Columbia. New York has
applied its substantive law to restrict rights acquired under this transaction.
For New York to apply its law to a transaction which occurred elsewhere
and with which it has no significant connection violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 07 As early as New York Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Head,0 8 the United States Supreme Court rejected, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, "the doctrine contended for... that because
a State has power to regulate its domestic concerns therefore, it has the
right to control the domestic concerns of other states."'109 And in Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing,11° Mr. Justice Holmes declared that "the
Constitution and the first principles of legal thinking allow the law of the
place where a contract is made to determine the validity and consequences
of the act.""' Accordingly, application of New York law to abridge rights
acquired under transfer in the District of Columbia violates the Due
Process Clause.
Moreover, the New York court violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in still another way. It held that while denying
107 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
108 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
109 Id. at 163. Accord: New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 375 (1918).
110 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
M1 Id. at 214.
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the plaintiff a New York remedy, plaintiff was free to sue in another juris-
diction. However, if the defendant is a New York resident, and service
cannot therefore be obtained elsewhere, the closing of the New York courts
does in actual fact deprive the corporation of any real remedy at all. Such
a construction of the New York statute therefore makes that act, as so
construed, violative of due process, for it is not consistent with due process
to deny to a party a forum in which to litigate his claims. As one case
held: "No one would contend that a law of a State, forbidding all redress
by actions at law for injuries to property, would be upheld in the courts
of the United States, for that would be to deprive one of his property
without due process of law.""u 2
(b) Full Faith and Credit Clause. If the action of the New York court
be viewed as a refusal to hear the claim, rather than the holding that the
claim is unenforceable, then the statute which it has construed as barring
the Association from a New York forum violates the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,113 and the statute implementing it.114 The New York courts are
narrowly restricted by this clause in the claims they may refuse to hear,
and evasion of full faith and credit obligations cannot be accomplished
by the simple-minded expedient of closing the courts. 115 As Mr. Justice
Brandeis declared:
It is true that a State can legislate only with reference to its own
jurisdiction, and that the full faith and credit clause does not
require the enforcement of every right which has ripened into a
judgment of another State or has been conferred by its statutes.
But the room left for the play of conflicting policies is a narrow
one. One State need not enforce the penal laws of another. A
State may adopt such system of courts and form of remedy as it
sees fit. It may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. But it may not, under the guise of merely affect-
ing the remedy, deny the enforcement of claims otherwise within
the protection of the full faith and credit clause, when its courts
have general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties.
For the States of the Union, the constitutional limitation imposed
by the full faith and credit clause abolished, in large measure,
the general principle of international law by which local policy
is permitted to dominate rules of comity.116
(c) Supremacy Clause. The laws of the sister states must look to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause for their efficacy elsewhere. Statutes in the
District of Columbia stand on a higher footing. Legislative power in the
112 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1885).
113 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
114 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
115 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U.S. 411 (1920).
116 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-3 (1935).
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District is exercised exclusively by Congress, 1 7 and the laws in force there
are statutes of the United States made by Congress."18
Congress "possesses full and unlimited jurisdiction to provide for the
general welfare of the District citizens by any and every act of legislation
which it may deem conducive to that end," 1 9 and "the exclusive responsi-
bility of Congress for the welfare of the District"'120 includes both the power
and the duty to provide its inhabitants with corporation laws by which
they may create private corporations, and to confer on such corporations
the power to sue and be sued, not only in the District courts, but else-
where.121
Nor may the question, if viewed as one of capacity to sue, be con-
sidered apart from the federal claim. The short answer to the contention
that the capacity of a foreign corporation to sue is governed by the law of
the forum'2 2 is that the capacity of federally-created corporations to sue is
governed by federal law because it is a federal question. As Chief Justice
John Marshall said in Osborn v. Bank of the United States:'23
The power. . . to sue on those contracts, is given and measured
by its charter, and that charter is a law of the United States. This
being can acquire no right, make no contract, bring no suit, which
is not authorized by a law of the United States. It is not only
itself the mere creature of a law, but all of its actions and all its
rights are dependent on the same law *** the same reasons exist
with respect to a suit brought by the bank ... that suit, too, is itself
authorized, and is brought on a contract authorized by a law of
the United States. It depends absolutely on that law, and cannot
exist a moment without its authority.124
Congress' power to create corporations has not been doubted since
McCullough v. Maryland, 25 dealing with the Bank of the United States.
The first act incorporating that Bank, passed in 1791, only two years after
ratification of the Constitution, by the first Congress which included many
117 United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
118 Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 9 (1889), where the
court said: "The sovereign power . . . is not lodged in the corporation of the District
of Columbia, but in the government of the United States. Its supreme legislative body is
Congress .... Crimes committed in the District are not crimes against the District, but
against the United States."
119 National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 601-2
(1949).
120 Id. at 590.
121 Ibid. It might be noted that while this case applies to District of Columbia
citizens generally, the plaintiff actually was a District of Columbia corporation.
122 Cf. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Argentine Airlines v. Air-
craft Dynamics Corp., 9 Misc.2d 272, 170 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1957).
123 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
124 Id. at 823-6.
125 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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framers of the "supreme law of the land," provided that the Bank would
have capacity "to sue or be sued . . . in courts of record, or any other
place whatsoever."' 126 As early as 1799, the New York Supreme Court held
that the Bank had capacity by virtue of this act to sue in state courts, and
the federal statute would be judicially noticed and need not be set forth.12
The second act incorporating the Bank was even more specific, and gave
it capacity "to sue and be sued . . in all state courts having competent
jurisdiction." 2 8
It has specifically been held that District of Columbia corporations
may sue in any state.1 9 Indeed, one federal case held that a corporation's
capacity to sue may only be asserted by a state, and not by a private
litigant.130
Capacity to sue is so basic to a corporation that even when the law
incorporating it is silent on the subject, it is considered as a power tacitly
annexed to the very incorporation itself. 131 The capacity to sue of a cor-
poration organized under Title 29, § 601 of the District of Columbia Code
has never been doubted. 3 2 Accordingly, federal and not state law governs
this question.
The legislative power which Congress exercises when it legislates for
the District is national power, 133 and as early as 1821, in Cohens v. Vir-
126 Act of Feb. 25, 1791, 1 Stat. 191, Ch. 10, § 3.
127 Bank of the United States v. Haskins, 1 Johns. Cas. 132 (N.Y., 1799). It might be
noted that it was not until Chancellor Kent's decision in Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4
Johns. Ch. 370 (N.Y., 1820), that it was held that foreign corporations generally might sue
in New York courts, and it was not until Chief Justice Taney's celebrated opinion in Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), that the principle that a foreign corpora-
tion might sue in a forum other than where it was chartered was generally recognized in
the United States. This is persuasive that the Congresses which chartered the first and
second Bank of the United States relied, in conferring capacity to sue on the Bank in
state courts, on a constitutional power of the federal government which would have to
be recognized as the supreme law of the land.
128 Act of April 10, 1816, 3 Stat. 266, Ch. 44, § 7.
129 Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board, 258 U.S. 549, 568-9
(1922), reversing 272 Fed. 132, 133 (W.D. Wash., 1921); Ingram Day Lbr. Co. v. United
States Shipping Board, 267 Fed. 283, 286 (S.D. Miss., 1920).
130 La Moine Lumber & Trading Co. v. Kesterson, 171 Fed. 980, 982 (C.C. Ore., 1909).
131 9 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 4226 (1931). In Bank of the
United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 67 (1827), Mr. Justice Story said: "To
corporations, however erected, there are said to be certain incidents attached, without any
express words or authority for this purpose: such as the power to plead and be impleaded,
to purchase and alien .... This is also the rule in New York. See Clarissy v. Metropolitan
Fire Dept., 7 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 352, 355 (N.Y., 1869).
132 Washington Chapter of American Institute of Banking v. District of Columbia,
92 U.S. App. D.C. 139, 203 F.2d 68 (1953); Better Business Bureau v. District Unemploy-
ment Comp. Bd., 34 A.2d 614 (D.C. Mun. App., 1943).
133 In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 539-40 (1933), the court declared:
"The object of the grant of exclusive legislation over the district was, therefore, national
in the highest sense, . . . In the same article which granted the powers of exclusive legisla-
tion over the seat of government are conferred all the other great powers which make
the nation, including the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. He
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ginia,'3 4 Chief Justice John Marshall said:
In the enumeration of the powers of Congress, which is made
in the 8th section of the first article, we find that of exercising ex-
clusive legislation over such district as shall become the seat of
government. This power, like all others which are specified, is
conferred on Congress as the legislature of the Union; for, strip
them of that character, and they would not possess it. In no other
character can it be exercised. In legislating for the district, they
necessarily preserve the character of the legislature of the Union;
for, it is in that character alone that the constitution confers on
them this power of exclusive legislation ...
The 2d clause of the 6th article declares, that "this constitu-
tion, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land."
The clause which gives exclusive jurisdiction is, unquestion-
ably, a part of the constitution, and, as such, binds all of the
United States. Those who contend that acts of Congress, made in
pursuance of this power, do not like acts made in pursuance of
other powers, bind the nation, ought to show some safe and clear
rule which shall support this construction, and prove that an act
of Congress, clothed in all the forms which attend other legislative
acts, and passed in virtue of a power conferred on, and exercised
by Congress, as the legislature of the Union, is not a law of the
United States, and does not bind them. 135
No state is permitted to deny effect to a federal statute, or close its
courts to federally-created claims on the grounds of an asserted state policy
or on any other pretext whatsoever. 136 Such a closing would presuppose a
state policy at variance with federal policy, a legal impossibility. As the
United States Supreme Court has pointed out:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with
the policy of the state, and therefore that the courts of the state
are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it
presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Con-
stitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the
states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as
much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from
would be a strict constructionist, indeed, who should deny to Congress the exercise of
this latter power in furtherance of that of organizing and maintaining a proper local
government at the seat of government. Each is for a national purpose, and the one may be
used in aid of the other."
'34 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
135 Id. at 424-5.
136 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947).
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its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the
courts of the state.'3 7
When the New York justice declared that a District of Columbia cor-
poration, deriving its powers from an Act of Congress, cannot sue in New
York, but must sue "in the jurisdiction which confers capacity to sue" he
,overlooked one salient fact, that the corporation is in fact suing in the
jurisdiction which conferred capacity to sue-it is suing in the United
.States-and until New York shall have successfully seceded from the Union,
:its capacity in New York is not one iota less than elsewhere.
(d) Characterization as It Affects Constitutional Issues. The New
York court, in denying the right of the corporation to sue based on its
successorship, in effect justified this decision by a characterization of the
right of a successor to sue as "procedural" rather than "substantive," and
hence determinable by the law of the forum. Such a characterization in
no wise justifies use of the law of the forum beyond that otherwise con-
stitutionally permissible, since the federal constitution does not permit a
state court to engage in the bootstraps operation of justifying the use of
its local law of a substantive nature through the device of calling it pro-
cedural. State court labels of "procedural" and "substantive" yield to-
federal constitutional scrutiny, and where the United States Supreme
Court finds a rule of law to be substantive in effect, a determination by a
state forum that it is procedural and hence governed by the forum's law
will be overturned.138
Thus, in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,139 the state courts treated the
contractual limitation as going to the remedy only, and hence governed
by the law of the forum. 140 The United States Supreme Court, however,
brushed this characterization aside. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated:
The statute is not simply one of limitation. It does not
merely fix the time in which the aid of the Texas courts may be
invoked. Nor does it govern only the remedies available in the
Texas courts. It deals with the powers and capacities of persons
and corporations. It expressly prohibits the making of certain
contracts. As construed, it also directs the disregard in Texas of
contractual rights and obligations wherever created and assumed;
and it commands the enforcement of obligations in excess of those
contracted for. Therefore, the objection that, as applied to con-
tracts made and to be performed outside of Texas, the statute vio-
lates the Federal Constitution, raises Federal questions of sub-
stance; and the existence of the Federal claim is not disproved
187 Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. 233 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
138 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
139 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
140 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 15 S.W.2d 1028 (Tex. 1929).
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by saying that the statute, or the one-year provision in the policy,
relates to the remedy and not to substance. 14 '
With the United States Supreme Court free to make its own charac-
terization of the problem here, it seems clear that its choice would be in
favor of characterization as substantive. A refusal to recognize the suc-
cessor as a proper party in effect is a denial of the successorship, as far
as the forum is concerned. "Clearly, 'substantive rights' are here so inter-
twined with 'form of remedy' or form of action that it is 'obvious' that
we are not dealing merely with the 'means of enforcing the substantive
rights.' "142 Indeed, for related purposes the Supreme Court has even
characterized burden of proof as substantive. 143 Here, refusal to recognize
the corporation as the proper party is not merely a determination of the
real party in interest. If, under District of Columbia law, the unincor-
porated group has merged into the corporation and the latter has suc-
ceeded to the claim, a refusal to permit the corporation to assert it must
necessarily entail, as far as New York is concerned, a complete negation
of the successorship effectuated elsewhere. This must necessarily be a
substantive problem.
A comparison of the laws of the two jurisdictions shows this clearly.
Under New York law, an unincorporated association may sue or be sued
as an entity in the name of its president or treasurer. 4 4 In the District of
Columbia, by common law an unincorporated association may likewise sue
or be sued as an entity, but here it must do so in the common name of the
group. 145 Which name is used is obviously a mere matter of procedure,
governed by the law of the forum. But whether it is the corporation or
the unincorporated entity which is suing is very much a matter of sub-
stance. It directly determines who shall receive the proceeds of the suit.
The corporation would be considered a different entity from the un-
incorporated association in the District of Columbia. New York's attitude
is the same. Hence, the problem is substantive.
Moreover, even New York would characterize competency to sue as
substantive. In Coster v. Coster,146 the Court of Appeals said:
Her right to bring and to maintain the suit and to recover dam-
ages against her spouse is a substantive right, a part of her cause
of action and not a mere matter of remedy. As to substantive
rights, the lex loci, not the law of the forum, controls and will be
enforced in the courts of the forum in a transitory action such as
141 281 US. at 407.
142 Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L.J. 333,
350 (1933). See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882).
143 Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511-2 (1915).
144 N.Y. General Associations Law, §§ 12, 13; Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers,
287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E.2d 919 (1942).
145 Busby v. Electrical Utilities Employees Union, 147 F.2d 865 (C.A.D.C. 1945).
14e 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
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this unless our public policy forbids. But our public policy to
permit the maintenance by one spouse of a suit against the other
to recover damages for personal injuries does not require or
authorize our courts to ignore foreign law affecting substantive
rights where such law merely differs from our own. To render
the foreign law unenforceable here as contrary to our public
policy under such circumstances, it must additionally violate "some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."'147
Hence, traditional New York conflict of laws doctrine, in accord with
general rules, would require reference to District of Columbia law. The
Supremacy Clause serves here to reinforce this obligation.
Conclusion
The freedom of state courts to ignore deeply-rooted conflict of laws
rules in favor of local parochialism is narrowly restricted by the federal
constitution. In the recent case of Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4s
a majority of the Second Circuit held that New York might constitutionally
apply its law to a New York contract of carriage even though a tort viola-
tive thereof fortuitously occurred elsewhere. By analogy, since the assign-
ment was made in the District of Columbia, its law should apply regardless
of the place of the libel. However, the majority further warned: "If, in-
deed, those connections are wholly lacking or at best tenuous, then it may
be proper to conclude that the state has exceeded its constitutional power
in applying its local law."
The rationale of the panel which had held the New York rule uncon-
stitutional was even more emphatic that a state may not apply its local
law to a transaction with which it is really not concerned. It said:
For the essence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is that certain
transactions, wherever in the United States they may be litigated,
shall have the same legal consequences as they would have in the
place where they occurred .... But if a transaction is so associated
with one jurisdiction that the Constitution compels any forum in
which the transaction is litigated to apply the law of that juris-
diction, is it not the Constitution instead of state conflicts law
which determines what law the federal court shall apply?149
Here, New York has no interest in the successorship. New York's courts
lack any conceivable interest in whether out-of-state citizens or organiza-
tions may transfer their claims to out-of-state corporations. The state
147 Id. at 511-2.
148 N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
149 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 134-5 (2d Cir. 1962), quoting
from the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in First National Bank v. United Airlines, 342
US. 396, 400 (1951).
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provides only the forum. Constitutional requirements and elementary
conflict of laws principles both point to the District of Columbia as the
source of governing substantive law.
Accordingly, this case not only misconstrues its own law, but in the
process renders its own statute unconstitutional on at least three different
grounds. The result is to provide a striking example of twentieth-century
provincialism whose result is all the more startling because it is so far at
variance with New York's own law and public policy.
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